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PROFESSOR RICHARD EPSTEIN AND THE NEW ZEALAND
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT: A CRITIQUE
NICK WAILES*
Penelope Brook, one of the major proponents of radical reform in the
New Zealand labor law system, has characterized the New Zealand Em-
ployment Contracts Act (ECA) as an "incomplete revolution."' She argues
that this "incompleteness" stems from the retention of a specialist labor law
jurisdiction and the failure to frame the Act around the principle of contract
at will.2 The emphasis placed on these two issues-specialist jurisdiction
and contract at will-demonstrates the influence arguments made by Chi-
cago Law Professor, Richard Epstein, have played on labor law reform in
New Zealand. Despite reservations about its final form, Brook gives her
support to the ECA, precisely because it operationalizes some of Epstein's
ideas.
It has been generally acknowledged that ideas like those of Epstein
played a significant role in the introduction of the ECA in New Zealand.
However, while critics of the ECA have acknowledged the importance of
Epstein's ideas in the debate which led up to the passing of the Act, few at-
tempts have been made to outline clearly or critique Epstein's views. This
Paper attempts to fill this lacuna by providing a critique of the behavioral
assumptions that Epstein brings to his analysis of labor law. The first sec-
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Philosophical Assumptions of a Common Law for Labor Relations, 19 N.Z.J. INDUs. REL. 1
(1994). I would like to thank Nigel Haworth, John Deeks, Rose Ryan, and the anonymous
referees for the N.Z.J.I.R. for useful comments on the original version of this Article. I would
also like to thank Ellen Dannin for her encouragement. The remaining errors are mine alone.
1. Penelope Brook, New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act: An Incomplete Revolu-
tion, 7 PoLIcY 6 (1991); see also Penelope Brook-Cowen, Labor Relations Reform in New
Zealand; The Employment Contracts Act and Contractual Freedom, 14 J. LAB. RES. 69
(1993) [hereinafter Labor Law Reform in New Zealand]; and Penelope Brook-Cowen, Neo-
liberalism, in NEW ZEALAND POLmTcs IN TRANSrrION (Ray Miller ed., 1997), in which she
argues that the ECA fails to meet the standard of contractual freedom that is required. The
case made by Brook for the adoption of a contractual labor law system in New Zealand can
be found in Penelope Brook, Reform the Labour Market, in ROGERNOMICs: RESHAPING NEW
ZEALAND'S ECONOMY (Simon Walker ed., 1989) and PENELOPE BROOK, FREEDOM AT WORK:
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tion of this Paper briefly outlines the context within which Epstein's argu-
ments were used to support the reform of labor law in New Zealand, in the
period leading up to the introduction of the ECA, and in the subsequent
criticisms by employer groups of the specialist jurisdiction. The second sec-
tion reviews Epstein's attack on a specialist jurisdiction for labor law, his
view that a simplified common law is an adequate basis for the regulation of
the employment relationship, and his advocacy of contract at will as the ba-
sis for an efficient and equitable employment relationship. It demonstrates
that these conclusions are linked to two behavioral assumptions that lie at
the heart of Epstein's social and political philosophy-the theory of self-
ownership and the theory of self-interest. The third section demonstrates
how these behavioral assumptions have allowed Epstein to dismiss as ill
founded criticisms made of his approach to labor relations by pluralist labor
lawyers. The fourth section argues that Epstein's behavioral assumptions,
and the subsequent conclusions he reaches about the employment relation-
ship, constitute a problematic and flawed basis on which to frame labor
legislation. The conclusion argues that empirical evidence concerning the
impact of the ECA on social equity in New Zealand validates the criticisms
of Epstein's behavioral assumptions.
EPSTEIN, THE ECA, AND THE SPECIALIST JURISDICTION DEBATE
The ECA represented a dramatic change in the legislative pattern of la-
bor market regulation in New Zealand? The origins of this dramatic change
can be found in the economic problems facing New Zealand in the 1980s,
and the particular response taken by policy makers to these economic prob-
lems. The New Zealand economy has been in a phase of long-term stagna-
tion since the late 1960s. Dramatic falls in the terms of trade for traditional
agricultural export products threatened the viability of the domestic defense
model of economic development which had been developed in the 1930s.'
Economic uncertainty and external shocks were met with increasingly inter-
ventionist state policies as the New Zealand government attempted to man-
3. See Gordon Anderson, The Employment Contracts Act 1991: An Employers Charter?,
16 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 127 (1991); Kevin Hince & Martin Vranken, A Controversial Reform
of New Zealand Labour Laws; The Employment Contracts Act 1991, 130 INT'L LAB. REV.
475; and Pat Walsh, The Employment Contracts Act, in THE DECENT SOCIETY? ESSAYS IN
RESPONSE TO NATIONAL'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES 64-69 (Jonathan Boston & Paul
Daziel eds., 1992) [hereinafter The Employment Contracts Act] (overviews the ECA's provi-
sions and consequences); see also Pat Walsh, Employment Policy, in NEW ZEALAND POLITICS
IN TRANSITION (Ray Miller ed., 1997) [hereinafter Employment Policy] and Brook-Cowen,
Labor Relations Reform in New Zealand, supra note 1, for differing accounts of the nature of
the change in the pattern of labor market regulation associated with the introduction of the
ECA.
4. BRIAN EASTON, IN STORMY SEAS: THE NEW ZEALAND ECONOMY SINCE 1945 (1997);
Brian Easton & Ralph Gerritsen, Economic Reform: Parallels and Divergences, in THE
GREAT EXPERIMENT: LABOR PARTIES AND PUBLIC POLICY TRANSFORMATION IN AUSTRALIA
AND NEW ZEALAND (Francis Castles et al. eds., 1996).
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1 [1997], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol28/iss1/5
1997] EPSTEIN AND THE ECA: A CRITIQUE
age its way through the economic crisis. By the early 1980s, the New Zea-
land economy was in a perilous position.5
In 1984, a newly elected Labour government set about dramatic reform
of the New Zealand economy. The primary aim of these reforms was to re-
structure fundamentally the relationship between the state and the econ-
omy.6 It did so by attempting to remove almost all government regulation
and control of factor and product markets, and expanding the scope for mar-
ket mechanisms to ensure efficient allocation of resources.7 The adoption of
this reform agenda reflected a number of factors. First, there was a wide-
spread belief that there was no alternative, given the apparent failure of all
forms of state regulation to resolve the economic problem in the Muldoon
era. Second, the reform agenda stemmed from the influence of an increas-
ingly powerful Treasury which had been fostering monetarist ideas since the
early 1970s. Third, many in the Labour party leadership had an intellectual
predisposition towards market-based solutions.8 Finally, similar policy
5. See Herman Schwartz, Can Orthodox Stabilisation and Adjustment Work? Lessons
from New Zealand 1984-1990, 45 INT'L ORG. 221, 235-38 (1991), for a detailed account of
the economic problems facing the New Zealand government during the early 1980s; see
Brian Easton, From Run to Float: The Making of Rogernomics Exchange Rate Policy, in THE
MAKING OF ROGERNOMICS (Brian Easton ed., 1989), for details of the current crisis facing the
newly elected Labour government in 1984. See also Robert Castle & Nigel Haworth, The
Economic Imperative for Restructuring in Australia and New Zealand, in ECONOMIC
RESTRUCTURING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEw ZEALAND: A COM-
PARATIVE ANALYSIS (Mark Bray & Nigel Haworth eds., 1993), and Easton & Gerritsen, supra
note 3, for a more general overview.
6. This issue has received considerable attention in the literature. See, as examples of the
best work in relation to this issue, Brian Easton, The Commercialisation of the New Zealand
Economy: From Think Big to Privatisation, in THE MAKING OF ROGERNOMICS (Brian Easton
ed., 1989) [hereinafter Commercialisation of the New Zealand Economy]; BRIAN EASTON,
THE COMMERCIALISATION OF NEW ZEALAND (1997); JANE KELSEY, ROLLING BACK THE STATE:
PRIVATISATION OF POWER IN AOTEAROA/NEw ZEALAND (1993); JANE KELSEY, THE NEW
ZEALAND EXPERIMENT: A WORLD MODEL FOR STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT? [hereinafter THE
NEW ZEALAND EXPERIMENT]; Conrad Blyth, The Economists 'Perspective of Economic Re-
structuring, in ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION IN NEW ZEALAND (Allan Bollard & Robert Buckle
eds., 1987); Jonathan Boston, The Theoretical Underpinnings of Public Sector Restructuring
in New Zealand, in RESHAPING THE STATE: NEW ZEALAND'S BUREAUCRATIC REVOLUTION
(Jonathan Boston et al. eds., 1991); Paul Daziel, The Reserve Bank Act: Reflecting Changing
Relationships between State and Economy in the Twentieth Century, in STATE AND ECONOMY
IN NEW ZEALAND (Brian Ropier & Chris Rudd eds., 1993).
7. For an overview of the changes introduced, see chapters in ECONOMIC LIBERALI-
SATION IN NEW ZEALAND (Allan Bollard & Robert Buckle eds., 1987); see also Schwartz, su-
pra note 5, at 240-43.
8. In relation to the apparent failure of Keynesian economic policy, see Easton, The
Commercialisation of the New Zealand Economy, supra note 6; and Geoff Bertram, Keynesi-
anism, Neoclassicism and the State, in STATE AND ECONOMY IN NEW ZEALAND (Brian Roper
& Chris Rudd eds., 1993). On the rise of monetarism and the power of the Treasury, see
Jonathan Boston, The Treasury and the Organisation of Economic Advice: Some Interna-
tional Comparisons, in THE MAKING OF ROGERNOMICS (Brian Easton ed., 1989); and Shaun
Goldfinch & Brian Roper, Treasury's Role in State Policy Formation during the Post War
Era, in STATE AND ECONOMY IN NEW ZEALAND (Brian Roper & Chris Rudd eds., 1993). On
the predisposition of the leadership of the Labour Party for market-based reform, see Colin
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agendas adopted by Reagan and Thatcher in the early 1980s had been ap-
parently successful. However, the character of the New Zealand state, and in
particular the almost unconstrained power of the executive concentrated in
the Parliamentary cabinet to make legislative change, ensured that the re-
form program that followed the election of the Labour government was of a
character unmatched in scale and scope in any developed market economy.9
Despite substantial reform of almost all aspects of the economy and at-
tempts to foster the scope of market forces in most aspects of economic life,
the New Zealand economy continued to perform poorly in the second half
of the 1980s." While some economists attributed this poor economic per-
formance to the excessive focus on price stability at the expense of eco-
nomic growth, attention increasingly focused on continued state interven-
tion in the labor market as the final remaining impediment to the improved
economic performance promised by the reforms."
Labour had set about reforming most aspects of the economy during its
first term in office, but labor market reform was delayed until its second
term in office beginning in 1987. The 1987 Labour Relations Act was an
attempt to increase the level of labor market flexibility but at the same time
retain some of the protections of the traditional New Zealand industrial re-
lations system. The changes introduced include forcing amalgamations of
unions, removing reference to fixed relativities in the determination of
award wages, and allowing unions to opt out of award coverage and negoti-
ate workplace agreements with employers."2 Walsh argues that the variance
between the Labour Relations Act and the radical deregulation agenda in
James, The Policy Revolution: 1984-1993, in NEW ZEALAND POLITICS IN TRANSMON (Ray
Miller ed., 1997). Probably the best account for the origins of the post-1984 reform agenda is
W. Hugh Oliver, The Labour Caucus and Economic Policy Formation: 1981-1984, in THE
MAKING OF ROGERNONMICS (Brian Easton ed., 1989), which stresses the interaction of all these
forces.
9. For these reasons, former Labour Prime Minister, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, characterized
the New Zealand political system as one of "unbridled power." See GEOFFREY PALMER,
UNBRIDLED POWER: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW ZEALAND's CONSTITUTION AND
GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1987).
10. See Paul Daziel, National's Macroeconomic Policy, in THE DECENT SOCIETY?
ESSAYS IN RESPONSE TO NATIONAL'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES 20-31 (Jonathan Boston
& Paul Daziel eds., 1992), for an overview of the New Zealand economy 1984-1990 and the
financial crisis facing the incoming National government in 1990, respectively. See also
Brian Easton, Has Recent Economic Policy Succeeded?, Address to the 1996 Biennial Na-
tional Conference of the New Zealand Engineering, Printing and Manufacturing Union (Aug.
8, 1996) (on file with author), and THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIMENT, supra note 6, at 243-70,
for an overview of the reform process which questions the extent to which it has delivered
economic benefits.
11. See, in particular, Daziel, supra note 10, at 23, for the view that excessive focus on
price stability had undermined the prospects for economic growth; see Brook, Reform the
Labour Market and FREEDOM AT WORK, supra note 1, for the argument that lack of flexibility
in the labor market was preventing the realization of improved economic performance prom-
ised by reforms in other sectors of the economy.
12. See JOHN DEEKS & PETER BOXALL, LABOUR RELATIONS IN NEW ZEALAND 41-56
(1989), for an overview of the changes introduced in the 1987 Labour Relations Act.
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other factor and product markets can be understood as a rear guard action by
unions, members of the New Zealand Labour Party, and the bureaucracy
concerned with the effects of deregulation in other areas of the economy. 3
Immediately after the Labour Relations Act was passed, the New Zea-
land Business Roundtable (BRT) began a public campaign for more radical
reform of the labor market.'4 Penelope Brook's work represents the most so-
phisticated of the arguments put forward by those associated with the BRT
in this period. She argued that the failure of the economic reforms intro-
duced by Labour during the second half of the 1980s could be largely attrib-
uted to the failure to reform the labor relations system. In particular, she ar-
gued that "there is little evidence that the new legislation [the Labour
Relations Act] is a means to the kind of rapid evolutions in employment re-
lationships made necessary by fundamental restructuring in other areas of
the economy.""' This, she argued, was because "the essentials of the system
remained.., largely untouched. [T]he assumption that monopoly unionism,
supported by the state, was the way to go about promoting the interests of
workers in the employment relationships went largely unchanged." '
6
On the basis of a sustained critique of the effects of state-sponsored
union monopoly status on equity and economic efficiency, Brook proposed
an alternative labor statute based on freedom of contract as a
"philosophically and theoretically consistent alternative to New Zealand's
current labor market arrangements.' 7 Brook's alternative contractual labor
market order drew almost exclusively from Epstein's writings on labor re-
lations.' Brook argued that the adoption of a contractual labor market order
13. Pat Walsh, A Family Fight? Industrial Relations Reform Under the Fourth Labour
Government, in THE MAKING OF RoGERNoMIcs (Brian Easton ed., 1989).
14. Walsh, The Employment Contracts Act, supra note 3, at 62. The BRT's objectives
for reform were first expressed in New Zealand Business Roundtable, NEW ZEALAND LABOUR
MARKEr REFORM: A SUBMISSION IN RESPONSE TO THE GREEN PAPER (1986). The BRT is an
organization consisting of the chief executive officers of New Zealand's largest companies. It
was formed in response to the perceived lack of big business influence on policy develop-
ment. See John Wanna, Centralisation without Corporatism: the Politics of New Zealand
Business in the Recession, 14 N.Z.J. INDUS. REL. 1, 6 (1989). By 1986, the BRT had ap-
pointed a full-time executive director who had previously been an Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury and was able to use the extensive resources of its member companies to fund and
promote a neo-liberal policy agenda. See Brian Roper, A Level Playing Field? Business Po-
litical Activism and State Policy Formation, in STATE AND ECONOMY IN NEW ZEALAND 163
(Brian Roper & Chris Rudd eds., 1993). Penelope Brook was a senior policy adviser to the
BRT from 1987-1990. She played a leading role in the development of the BRT's case for
labor market deregulation in New Zealand during this period, and her book, FREEDOM AT
WORK, supra note 1, represents the culmination of theoretical cases put forward by the BRT
in this period.
15. FREEDOM AT WORK, supra note 1, at 82.
16. Id. at 27.
17. Id. at 129.
18. Id. at 94-129. The contractual order proposed by Brook is drawn almost exclusively
from Richard Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal La-
bor Legislation, 92 YALEL.J. 1357 (1983) [hereinafter A Common Lawfor Labor Relations],
and Richard Epstein, In Defense of Contract at Will, 51 U. CHi. L. REv. 947 (1984)
1997]
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would both improve economic performance and ensure better standards of
equity."' It was this analysis, shaped heavily by a reading of Epstein's ideas,
which formed the basis of the policy statements made by BRT representa-
tives in the media and in policy forum."
The BRT provided the National government, elected in 1990, with an
explanation of why the previous reforms had not worked and a clear policy
agenda for further reform. Faced with a serious financial crisis and contin-
ued poor economic performance, the National government was responsive
to these ideas. It was in this particular context that Epstein's views on labor
law came to dominate labor market policy formation. Based on this view
that a contractual order in the labor market could achieve economic effi-
ciency, National introduced the ECA-"an Act designed to promote an effi-
cient labor market and in particular, (a) to allow for freedom of association;
(b) to allow employees to determine who should represent their interests in
relation to employment issues."22
While the BRT was able to influence the general thrust of the ECA, it
was not successful in gaining all of the changes it wanted. In particular, the
ECA retained a specialist jurisdiction for labor law. As Walsh and Ryan ar-
gue, this provision reflected the outcome of alterations made to the initial
policy proposals in the process of moving from Bill to Act.' In the face of
defeat over the retention of the specialist institutions and the perceived fail-
ure of the Employment Court to interpret the statute in line with parlia-
ment's intention, employer groups, and especially the BRT, have led an al-
most continuous attack on the specialist jurisdiction . Criticisms of both the
existence of the Employment Court, as a specialist body, and the nature of
its decisions, in particular in relation to its failure to allow freedom of con-
[hereinafter In Defense of Contract at Will].
19. FREEDOM AT WORK, supra note 1, at 129-60. For a replication of these arguments by
members of the BRT, see references given in Ellen Dannin, Consummating Market Based
Labor Law Reform in New Zealand: Context and Reconfiguration, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 267, at
303, n.180.
20. This issue is addressed in more detail in Nick Wailes, The (Re)discovery of the Indi-
vidual Contract of Employment in Australia and New Zealand, in INDviDUAL CONTRACTS
AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS (Andrew Frazer et al. eds., 1997).
21. Dannin, supra note 19, at 303, goes further to argue that "the main intellectual
source of the ECA can be traced back directly to the United States and almost exclusively to
one article by Richard Epstein," namely In Defense of Contract at Will.
22. Employment Contracts Act, 1991 (N.Z.).
23. Pat Walsh & Rose Ryan, The Making of the Employment Contracts Act, in EM-
PLOYMENT CONTRACTS: NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCES 23-28 (Raymond Harbridge ed., 1993);
Rose Ryan & Pat Walsh, Common Law v. Labour Law: the New Zealand Debate, 6 AUSTL J.
LAB. L. 230, 243-51 (1993).
24. See, e.g., THE LABOUR EMPLOYMENT COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LABOuR/
EMPLOYMENT' S COURT APPROACH TO THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF EMPLOYMENT
LEGISLATION (N.Z. Business Roundtable & Employers' Federation, 1992); Colin Howard,
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT 1991 (N.Z. Business Roundtable
& Employers' Federation, 1995); and Bernard Robertson, The Arguments for a Specialist
Employment Court in New Zealand, 21 N.Z.J. INDUS. REL. 34 (1997).
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tract or permit enforcement of contract at will, reflect the continued influ-
ence of Epstein's theories on the labor law debate in New Zealand.
EPSTEIN'S COMMON LAW FOR LABOR RELATIONS
The previous section has argued that Epstein's ideas on labor relations
came to play such an important role in policy development because of the
particular economic and political context in New Zealand at the end of the
1980s. His ideas have also continued to play a dominant role in the ongoing
criticisms by business groups of the institutions created by the ECA. This
implies that an effective critique of the ECA needs to be based on a critique
of Epstein's "common law for labor relations."25 The following section
briefly outlines the key features of Epstein's approach to labor relations.
Epstein argues that efforts to regulate the employment relationship
through specialist institutions have produced perverse, suboptimal, and dis-
criminatory outcomes in the labor market.26 He advocates the replacement of
all interventionist labor statutes by a minimal code which merely states the
common law principles that ought to apply to the employment relationship
and the abandonment of all specialist jurisdictions for labor law.'
Central to Epstein's argument is his particular definition of common
law. He defines the common law as the best set of private law principles
that can be devised to handle the problems of labor relations.28 He is not re-
ferring to common law as it is understood in its technical legal sense. Rather
his argument for "a" common law for labor relations is based on his view of
how the common law ought to function and the principles on which it ought
to be founded. Epstein's claim that, apart from an "unfortunate early flirta-
tion with the law of criminal conspiracy," the common law proper took a
very sound position in regulating the employment relationship in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century, reflects his belief that the decisions made
by courts in this period most closely approximated his view of how the
common law ought to function.29
Epstein's advocacy of a common law for labor relations stems from his
view that common law principles are based on a sound understanding of
human behavior and can effectively deal with a broad range of possible out-
comes in the labor market.3" First, common law principles, as he defines
25. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations, supra note 18; see also Richard Ep-
stein, Unconscionability: A Critical Appraisal, 19 J.L.& EcoN. 293 (1975), for the develop-
ment of similar ideas in relation to torts.
26. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations, supra note 18, at 1362-63, 1402; for
Epstein's detailed assessment of the detrimental consequences of specific unfair labor prac-
tices in U.S. labor law, see supra, at 1386-1402.
27. Id. at 1403; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD
151-69 (1995).
28. Epstein, A Common Lawfor Labor Relations, supra note 18, at 1359.
29. Id. at 1364.
30. Id. at 1359. In particular he attempts to show that unions can be accommodated
1997]
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them, are based on the assumption that "every person owns his own person
and can possess, use and dispose of his labor on whatever terms he sees
fit."'" The application of the law of property and the law of torts to employ-
ment relationships allows the establishment of a set of original entitlements
which provide the basis for voluntary transactions between workers and
employers.' Second, he argues that, in employment relationships, humans
act to maximize their self-interest." He argues that the law of contract-
with its acceptance of the mutual benefits of voluntary transactions, its abil-
ity to define the legality of contracts, and to determine the capacity of indi-
viduals to enter a contract-is well suited to regulating relationships be-
tween self-interested individuals. 4
On the basis of these assumptions, Epstein argues that a common law
statute can create a set of original entitlements and framework within which
private transactions between self-interested individuals can make mutually
beneficial transactions. 5 He argues that because the decision to become an
employer or an employee is a private act, based on preferences for risk, the
identity of the parties to voluntary transactions in the labor market should be
of no special concern to the state and ought not to be the occasion for an in-
crease of state regulation of private transactions. 6 This implies that the role
of the state ought to be limited to the faithful enforcement of voluntary
transactions reached between self-interested and self-owning individuals.
The extension of this argument is that there is no need for a specialist labor
law or specialist institutions with expertise in labor matters.
Therefore, it can be argued that Epstein's approach to labor relations,
which has been so influential in policy debates about labor market reform in
New Zealand, stems from a particular definition of how the common law
ought to function. Epstein's view of how the common law ought to function
within such a framework and that both the closed shop and "yellow dog" contracts can be
concluded within such a framework. However, he argues that such a system implies no right
to strike, being simply breach of contract, and in most circumstances picketing ought not be
tolerated because of the inextricable mixture of speech and violence in such situations. Id. at
1367-79 & at 1382-86.
31. Id. at 1364.
32. Id. at 1359.
33. Id. at 1407.
34. In fact, Epstein is a strong advocate for the return to the contract at will doctrine in
the employment relationship in the absence of a specific agreement. Epstein, In Defense of
Contract at Will, supra note 18, at 951-53, 979-82. He rejects the notion that the contract at
will leaves employees open to exploitation and coercion. Id. at 948-51. He argues that the
contract at will respects the freedom of individuals to bargain on whatever terms they see fit.
Furthermore, Epstein argues, the power of either party to end the contract at any time pre-
vents abuse of the relationship. This reflects Epstein's view that the notion of unequal bar-
gaining power confuses economic inequality with economic duress. He argues that such a
view is tantamount to arguing that all bargains involve duress. See Epstein, A Common Law
for Labor Relations, supra note 18, at 1367-69.
35. Id. at 1365-56.
36. Id. at 1366; see also Richard Epstein, The Varieties of Self Interest, 8 Soc. PHLL. &
PoL'Y 102, 104, 112 (1990) [hereinafter The Varieties of Self Interest].
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is based on two assumptions about the nature of human action- that indi-
viduals are self-owning and that in employment relationships individuals act
to maximize their self-interest. It is the derivation of "a common law for la-
bor relations" from these behavioral assumptions which Epstein believes
renders criticisms of his approach by pluralist labor lawyers meaningless.
EPSTEIN AND THE PLURALIST CRITIQUE
Epstein has been the subject of a number of criticisms from industrial
lawyers in the United States." Broadly, these critiques have focused on two
issues. First, they have argued that Epstein's presentation of the common
law as if it is unchanging is a major flaw in his argument. Getman and
Kohler argue that this presentation masks the limited time period in which
contract doctrine governed the employment relationship. 8 They argue that
the labor relations legislation that Epstein is so hostile to represents a reap-
plication of the traditional master and servant legal forms that dominated
employment law before the intellectual experiment of using contract law."
Verkuil puts forward a second, and related, criticism, arguing that Epstein
misrepresents the way in which the common law has dealt with employment
relationships in the period when the contract doctrine operated and, there-
fore, fails to understand the reason that the employment relationship was
taken away from the jurisdiction of the common law courts.4"
However, Epstein dismisses these objections as misguided." He char-
acterizes the weakness of the pluralist position as essentially empirical and
without a clear theoretical base. More importantly, in this context, he rejects
the view that how the common law has functioned in the past is of any rele-
vance to what he advocates. Epstein is not only interested in repealing the
Wagner Act (and by extension specialist jurisdiction for labor law gener-
ally), but also in purifying the common law itself of intrusions that do not
37. The following discussion deals specifically with the responses made directly to A
Common Law for Labor Relations, supra note 18, in the same issue of the journal in which it
first appeared. Epstein has been criticized by others, most notably Paul Weiler, GOvERNING
THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw 56-63, 119-24 (1990). The
aim of the following discussion is not to deny the validity of the criticisms made by these
authors, but rather to demonstrate the extent to which assumptions made by Epstein allow
him to dismiss these criticisms. My position is that a defense of specialist labor legislation
and jurisdiction needs to be based first and foremost on an assessment of the acceptability of
the assumptions from which Epstein proceeds.
38. Julius Getman & Thomas Kohler, The Common Law, Labor Law and Reality: A Re-
sponse to Professor Epstein, 92 YALE L. REV. 8, 1409-14 (1983); see also Walsh & Ryan,
Common Law v. Labour Law, supra note 23.
39. Id. at 1417-26.
40. Paul Verkuil, Whose Common Law for Labor Relations? Comment on Epstein, 92
YALE L. REv. 8, 1409-14 (1983); see also Walsh & Ryan, Common Law vs. Labour Law, su-
pra note 23, for a presentation of these criticisms in the New Zealand context.
41. Richard Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations and Reality: A Rejoinder to
Professors Getman and Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435 (1983).
19971
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directly relate to the theory of entitlements outlined above. Therefore, the
way in which the common law proper has dealt with the employment rela-
tionship prior to the development of contract is not his concern. Rather, he
argues that these features of the common law ought to be done away with
because they are not linked to the theory of entitlements." Epstein argues
that one of the specific impurities in the common law is the view that there
is a need for a separate body of law or separate institutions to deal with what
are essentially matters of property relations, like employment.
The second criticism leveled at him-that he fails to take account of the
historical circumstances under which the jurisdiction of labor law was taken
away from the common law courts-he believes is also wide of the mark.
Epstein sees the actions of the courts in the period leading up to Wagner as
demonstrating the need to reduce judicial activism and a reflection of the
rapid pace of social change." It was not, he argues, a demonstration of any
inherent failing of common law principles to deal with the employment re-
lationship. Epstein's argument is that it is this mistaken assumption-that
the common law cannot effectively deal with employment relationships-
which is the source of the failure of modem industrial relations systems to
promote efficient employment relationships.45 On this basis, Epstein is op-
posed to any notion of change or development in the common law itself.
This can be seen in the way he defines the common law. He does not view it
as a body of law based on precedent but the best (single) set of principles
derived from the "libertarian and utilitarian traditions of Locke, Bentham
and Mill."46 Furthermore, in line with his view that contract law is closely
related to human nature, Epstein does in fact argue that the common law
should be static around the theory of entitlements, therefore rejecting the
importance of accounts of how the common law has functioned.47 Epstein is
not interested in how the common law has functioned, but rather in how it
should function. Much of the confusion caused by Epstein's argument about
labor relations revolves around this point. In fact, he is not talking about the
common law proper, but rather a common law based on libertarian princi-
ples of human action.
42. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations, supra note 18, at 1360; and Richard
A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 254-56
(1980).
43. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, supra note 42, at 255; EPSTEIN,
SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD, supra note 27, at 151-53; RIcHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN 279-81 (1985); Richard Ep-
stein, Towards a Revitalization of the Contracts Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 729 (1984).
44. Epstein, A Common Lawfor Labor Relations, supra note 18, at 1363-69.
45. Id. at 1360-63, 1400-03; Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations and Reality,
supra note 41, at 1435-37, 1441; EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD, supra note
27, at 154 and 163-64.
46. Id. at 1435.
47. Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
253 (1980).
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Clearly, then, criticisms of the type put forward by Getman, Kohler,
and Verkuil do not correctly identify what Epstein believes to be the source
of his case for a common law for labor relations. They do not acknowledge
the link that Epstein makes between an understanding of human behavior
and the usefulness of common law principles. This is best understood in re-
lation to the standard against which Epstein judges common law princi-
ples-individual freedom. "The protection of private contracts against gov-
ernment regulation is inseparably entwined with two elements-individual
freedom.., and the need to prevent legislative mis-behavior."48 He sees the
"importance of contract as an end in itself... (because it implies) the re-
spect of individual liberty. It is unjust to abridge the economic liberties of
an individual."49 By not confronting this relationship, Getman, Kohler, and
Verkuil fail to understand the nature of Epstein's challenge to pluralism.
SELF-INTEREST AND SELF-OWNERSHIP
This section argues that Epstein's behavioral assumptions are extremely
problematic and that any analysis based on them is seriously flawed. How
can Epstein claim that "the decision to become an employer or an employee
is an entirely private one based on individual preference for risk?"'5 This
statement disarms much of the pluralist critique because it denies the fun-
damental assumption that an imbalance of power exists in the employment
relationship and that this imbalance is the source of conflict in the work-
place. However, Epstein's claim is not an unproblematic notion, but rather
represents the summary of a complex set of behavioral assumptions which
need to be examined further.
Epstein asserts that the most important features of human action, in
most situations, are best understood by the theory of self-interest." He ar-
gues that the normative basis of social and political philosophy ought to be
derived from this positive (descriptive) observation. 2 Epstein's self-interest
thesis can be summarized as follows. In a wide variety of human activities,
human action is best explained not by using social categories but rather by
concentrating on biological factors. He argues that what is particular to hu-
mans, and therefore what constitutes their nature, is that they will maximize
their self-interest within certain moral, legal, and social constraints. 3 This
he believes follows from the selection of the genotypes which maximize
self-interest as a means of survival. He moderates this "standard model of
self-interest" with a number of devices, such as inclusive fitness and imper-
fect obligation, but argues that in a situation of voluntary exchange between
48. Epstein, Towards a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, supra note 43, at 717.
49. In Defense of Contract at Will, supra note 18, at 951.
50. A Common Lawfor Labor Relations, supra note 18, at 1366.
51. Epstein, The Varieties of Self Interest, supra note 36, at 102.
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strangers, as in the employment relationship, a standard model of self-
interest most accurately predicts behavior.' On the basis of this formulation,
Epstein attempts to assess the normative implications of self-interest-
distinguishing the constant and variable features of human nature to deter-
mine the social arrangements that hold the greatest long-term social advan-
tage. This "requires an understanding of the interaction between the self in-
terest constant and diverse natural endowments."" He argues that the
persistence of self-interest and variations in preferences is the strongest jus-
tification for the use of a decentralized system of property allocation, and
therefore a common law regime based on these principles.'
Using the biological derivation of self-interest and the argument that
(genetic) diversity produces differences in preferences and tastes for risk, he
is able to argue that some individuals assume the nature of employees and
others of employers depending on their initial (biological) endowments.57
The fact that an employer has a higher taste for risk allows him/her to have
a greater say over the decisions in the business. Unlike Nozick, Epstein ac-
knowledges that voluntary exchanges generate negative externalities, but
asserts that these are reduced as voluntary exchanges become routine for
broad classes of transactions." Therefore, a common law for labor relations
allows for predictability and reduces externalities from exchange. Further,
he argues that a system based on private property and individual liberty will
generate the closest approximation to the Pareto optimal social contract,
given natural differences in preferences that cannot be measured."
A number of problems with Epstein's theory of self-interest raise
doubts about its usefulness. Epstein's model stems from the application of
socio-biology to his social and political philosophy."0 Rosenburg argues that,
for socio-biology to have any normative influence, it has to address two key
issues." First, it must show that the naturalistic fallacy can be overcome by
demonstrating how a purely factual property of organisms can "underwrite
their status as agents or loci of intrinsic value."'62 Second, if this can be
achieved, it must show that this property is common and peculiar to all hu-
54. "Inclusive fitness holds that all organisms act to maximize not only their individual
fitness, but the fitness of their entire genetic line as well." The Varieties of Self Interest, supra
note 36, at 102. Imperfect obligation refers to religious belief, caring activity, etc. This is a
device that Epstein takes from socio-biology as a means of dealing with the difficulties that a
simple egoistic assumption poses for his analysis.
55. Id. at 103.
56. Id. at 104-05.
57. Id. at 112-14.
58. Id. at 117; ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATEAND UTOPIA (1974).
59. The Varieties of Self Interest, supra note 36, at 117.
60. Id.; EPsTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF THE EMIjErr DOMAIN,
supra note 43, at 1341, n.19.
61. A. Rosenburg, The Biological Justification of Ethics: A Best Case Scenario, 8 Soc.
PI-n. & POL'Y 86 (1990).
62. Id. at 88. The naturalistic fallacy applies to any inference that purports to derive a
normative conclusion from purely factual premises.
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mans so that it will count as constituting our nature. This is exactly what
Epstein tries to do. He deliberately ignores the critiques of Moore and
Hume, and explicitly seeks to derive "ought" from "is." He uses the biologi-
cal constant of self-interest to satisfy the second condition. However, Ro-
senburg argues that models that use socio-biology cannot satisfy this second
condition because socio-biology's underlying tenet is that there is no such
property common and peculiar to each member of the species; rather, they
require variation both within and between species.63 Therefore, it is not clear
that the idea of a self-interest residual, which is so important in Epstein's
argument, is consistent with a socio-biological methodology.
In the absence of being able to establish any direct normative impor-
tance, Rosenburg argues that the most that can be expected from these types
of models is to tell a plausible story, but questions the value of such an ex-
ercise.64 In effect, Epstein's model confronts the genetic fallacy-to infer
that a particular normative conclusion is right or well grounded from a
purely causal account of its origins. Epstein's model of self-interest, there-
fore, is severely limited in its ability to underpin normative conclusions.
Given the role biological foundations play in Epstein's work on labor
relations, it is important to provide an alternative evaluation of self-interest.
Lewontin argues that models like the one considered here reflect the need
for bourgeois society to explain continued inequalities that exist in a market
society. 65 Epstein's work on labor relations seeks to justify, or dismiss as
unimportant, the inequalities that exist in employment relationships. Le-
wontin argues that "the ideology of equality has become a weapon for,
rather than a weapon against, a society of inequality by relocating the cause
of the inequality from the structure of society to the nature of individuals."'
It is possible to situate this project in Epstein's work. He expresses the ine-
qualities that exist between individuals in terms of the process of natural
selection, but at the same time argues that the only basis for assessing the
employment relationship is on the basis of equality and the common law
principle of not considering the positions of the parties to a contract, inde-
pendent of the functioning of that contract.
Epstein's self-interest thesis conforms to the three features of a biologi-
cally deterministic argument. He locates inequality in the genetic inheri-
tance of the individual. Thus, he attributes an intrinsic merit and ability to
those who are better off-in this case, employers. Second, because merit
and ability are coded for in an individual's genes, they are passed from gen-
eration to generation. Lewontin argues that this construction confuses the
two meanings of inheritance-monetary and genetic, legitimizing the pas-
63. E. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS (1975).
64. Rosenburg, supra note 61. at 89, 90.
65. Richard Lewontin et al., Bourgeois Ideology and the Origins of Biological Deter-
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sage of social power from generation to generation.' Third, Epstein uses the
presence of genetic differences to explain the development of hierarchical
structures as natural. In doing so, Epstein falsely equates innate with un-
changing and wrongly assumes that he can overcome the naturalistic fal-
lacy.
The second behavioral assumption that Epstein relies on is that of self-
ownership. The key to his argument that the common law, as he defines it,
can effectively deal with the employment relationship is his ability to as-
sume that all people own their own labor and can dispose of it as they see
fit. In other words, he seeks to reduce employment to a matter of exchanges
of property rights. This view runs counter to the pluralist position that labor
is not simply a factor of production. Brook, who relies heavily on Epstein,
argues that to say that labor is a commodity is simply to say that it has
value." This model can be characterized as one which is structured around a
Lockean "person." Epstein, in relying on self-ownership, places the ideal-
typical "person" developed by Locke at the heart of his argument. Levine
argues that the profound changes associated with the development of a mar-
ket society in the seventeenth century required the development of ideal-
typical types to act as both a spur to acceptance of a market society and to
justify the inequalities that a market society produced.69 MacPherson argues
that Locke's great achievement was to justify continued inequality in the
face of a formal equality, and that the means by which he did this was in ar-
guing that each individual owned his or her own labor.7" Because self-
ownership is not inconsistent with the right to alienate one's labor in return
for a wage, MacPherson argues, unequal property is a natural feature that
exists prior to the formation of civil society. To partake in a market society,
individuals had to have initial endowments. Therefore, Locke's ideal typical
type assigned (differential) initial endowments to the (pre-social) state of
nature. Epstein uses socio-biology to construct these pre-social differences.
Levine argues that this formulation excludes any notion of inequality from
the analysis, because inequities are seen as a function of nature and not so-
ciety.71 Therefore, Epstein's use of self-ownership allows him to claim that
there is no inequality in the employment relationship.
Furthermore, even given the general problems associated with using a
Lockean person, there are a number of specific problems with the way Ep-
stein uses and constructs this ideal typical type that undermine his behav-
ioral assumptions. The first problem with Epstein's use of the Lockean per-
son is that he employs this device on the basis of weak informational
constraints about the slope of preferences, rather than on the basis of moral
67. Id.
68. Brook, FREEDOM AT WORK, supra note 1, at 13.
69. A. Levine, Capitalist Persons, 6 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 39, 39-43 (1988).
70. C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLMCAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES
To LOCKE 198-262 (1962).
71. Levine, supra note 69, at 53-55.
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apriorism, as Nozick does." This creates significant confusion in his argu-
ment. Epstein excludes the state from having a useful role in regulating the
employment relationship because it lacks the necessary information about
the slope of preferences of individuals, but does not exclude this possibility
in theory. Therefore, his reversion to a Lockean formation is a secondary
device. However, his analysis then proceeds from a position which assumes
the existence of the individual prior to the social-thus assuming that the
Lockean person is primary. 3
A second, and related problem, is Epstein's reconstruction of the status
of appropriation in the Lockean framework. Locke argued that individuals
had the right to the product of their labor as long as there was as much and
as good left for others. However, as Epstein notes, in a world of scarcity,
this condition is impossible to satisfy. 4 He, therefore, uses a welfare con-
straint-normally known as a Lockean proviso. The appropriation of inter-
nal resources, generated through self-interest, does not affect the welfare of
others because they are not accessible to others. However, external appro-
priation is more problematic, because as he has already acknowledged, scar-
city prevents satisfaction of the sufficiency principle. He attempts to over-
come this problem by arguing that the extension of voluntary transactions
limits the welfare losses associated with external appropriation. However, it
is not at all clear that self-ownership necessarily implies justifiable control
over external resources, except where it is already assumed that a market
society exists and that the outcomes of market exchange are just. Cohen
demonstrates that, even where individuals are self-owning, joint control of
external resources can result in an equal distribution." This is contrary to
Epstein's implicit assumption that self-ownership necessitates a hierarchical
social structure. Broadly, the status of self-ownership in Epstein's model is
uncertain and confused, and the logical consistency that he claims for his
analysis of labor relations relies on poorly constructed behavioral assump-
tions.
72. EPsTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN,
supra note 43, at 334-48; Nozick, supra note 58, at 174-82.
73. The position adopted here is similar to that taken by Charles Fried: "Only by as-
suming that the preexisting common law system of property rights had some natural, precon-
ventional status can the expropriationary thrust of the Wagner Act... be criticized.... What
Epstein needs, but in my view does not provide, is an account of the relevant property rights
that shows why they are preconventional and why they should be protected from government
tampering." Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on
the Current State of Labor Law and its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1016-17 (1984).
74. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGs: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF THE EMINENT
DOMAIN (1984).
75. Gerry Cohen, Nozick on Appropriation, 150 NEw LEFT REv. 89 (1985); Gerry Co-
hen, Self Ownership and Equality: Part 11, 3 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 77 (1986).
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CONCLUSION: THE EFFECTS OF THE ECA AND EPSTEIN'S BEHAVIORAL
ASSUMPTIONS
The consequences of a labor statute based on Epstein's ideas can be
seen in the effects of the ECA in New Zealand since its introduction. The
obvious effects of the ECA in New Zealand have been a dramatic decline in
the level of trade union membership, a commensurate decline in the cover-
age of collective bargaining, and an almost total disappearance of multi-
employer collective bargaining." These outcomes were meant to result in an
increase in economic efficiency.
The overall economic impacts of the ECA are less easy to identify, or
to disentangle, from the effects of other policies or external factors." Advo-
cates of the ECA have been quick to argue that it has been largely responsi-
ble for recent improvements in the New Zealand economy by removing the
remaining impediments to greater productivity." Rejecting this view, Easton
suggests that the major effect of the ECA has been to lower the shares of in-
come going to labor and to suppress real wages, increasing profitability, not
productivity.79 Rasmussen finds in the period 1990-1994 productivity
growth in New Zealand was 0.4 percent per annum on average."0 This repre-
sented a deterioration of productivity performance in New Zealand from the
1984-1990 period, when it grew by 2.2 percent on average per annum. For
Rasmussen, this poor productivity performance in New Zealand can be re-
garded as even more dismal than the raw figures suggest, because general
recovery in the economy should have reinforced productivity growth."' Real
wages over the period 1990 to 1996 have increased by only about 2 percent.
When labor force composition effects and margins for error are taken into
account, it is not possible to say whether real wages have increased at all. 2
Despite low productivity growth, Easton shows that real wages have not
kept pace with this growth. Deflating real wages by productivity growth, he
shows that this ratio has declined 4 percent since 1990, and concludes that it
would not be unreasonable to attribute this decline to the ECA. Therefore,
workers have not shared in the income they have helped to generate. This
decline in the share of income going to labor can be regarded as contribut-
ing to the continued increase in income inequality in New Zealand during
76. Employment Policy, supra note 3, at 282 (citing RAYMOND HARBRIDGE, LABOUR
MARKET REGULATION AND EMPLOYMENT: TRENDS IN NEW ZEALAND (1994)).
77. Id. at 282-83.
78. See, in particular, WOLFGANG KASPER, FREE TO WORK: THE LIBERALISATION OF NEW
ZEALAND'S LABOUR MARKET STRucru s, 51-52 (1996).
79. Brian Easton, The Productivity Puzzle, THE LISTENER, July 27, 1996, at 51.
80. Erling Rasmussen et al., Industrial Relations and Labour Market Reforms in New
Zealand, in HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK 1995-96: KEY HRD/ LABOUR
MARKET ISSUES IN SELECTED ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIES 157 (1995).
81. Id. at 158.
82. Brian Easton, Does Free to Work Tell a True Story? 2, 3 (unpublished paper, on file
with author). This paper is a response to Kasper, supra note 78.
16
California Western nternational Law Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1 [1997], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol28/iss1/5
EPSTEIN AND THE ECA: A CRITIQUE
the 1990s.
These adverse consequences of the ECA on social equity in New Zea-
land can be directly attributed to the way in which the ECA has been based
on views like Epstein's. Epstein's case for the abolition of a specialist juris-
diction and the application of common law principles, as he defines them, to
the employment relationship rest on a set of radical behavioral assumptions.
This Paper has demonstrated a number of key features about Epstein's ar-
gument. It has shown that Epstein's case for the abolition of the specialist
jurisdiction rests upon the thesis of self-interest and self-ownership, and that
these behavioral assumptions cannot be sustained. Specifically, the theory
of self-interest confronts the naturalistic fallacy. Without normative status,
it simply operates in a deterministic fashion to exclude inequality from Ep-
stein's analysis. Also, the use of the Lockean person is confused both in its
status and its construction. The implication of this critique, which is con-
firmed by empirical evidence about the ECA, is that the application of the
common law principles that Epstein advocates to employment relations are
likely to have adverse effects on employees because they lack initial en-
dowments.
83. Employment Policy, supra note 3, at 282, 286; see also THE NEW ZEALAND Ex-
PERIMENT, supra note 6, at 256-59.
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